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THE CITIZENSHIP OF OTHERS
Muneer I. Ahmad*
INTRODUCTION
The liberal notion of citizenship provides equality to all citizens, without
regard to ascriptive or other differentiating characteristics. In this sense,
citizenship promises to be dispositive of the treatment of all individuals
who enjoy it; citizenship is uniform, unalloyed, and indivisible. These are
the attributes of citizenship within a liberal national system, governing the
relationships between citizens and the state, and among citizens within the
state. But must these characteristics extend into the international realm, or
may states choose to look beyond the mantle of citizenship when evaluating
the citizens of others? And if states do choose to differentiate, and thereby
discriminate, among the citizens of others, what obligations do those
citizens’ states bear?
This Article considers two instances in which the formal equality of
citizenship is jeopardized by discrimination on the basis of national origin
(the place of one’s birth) and ancestry (the place of one’s ancestors’ birth).
The first concerns the recent policy of India to subject U.S. citizens of
Pakistani descent to differential treatment when applying for visas to visit
India. The second concerns an ongoing political controversy in the United
States around whether to grant Israel admission to the visa waiver
program—which would waive the need for Israeli and U.S. citizens to apply
for visas to the other country—while permitting Israel to continue to subject
U.S. citizens of Palestinian or Arab descent to differential treatment. By
deploying national origin and ancestry as proxies for national security
threat, both cases violate American notions of equal citizenship, thereby
implicating questions of U.S. responsibility to ensure the equal treatment of
its citizens by foreign governments.
The reliance upon national origin and ancestry discrimination by India
and Israel exposes the multiplicity of citizenship theory and practice across
self-conceived liberal democracies, the notion that citizenship values are
culturally bounded, and the idea that citizenship performs different forms of
work in different societies. This should not be surprising, as citizenship is a
central technology of the national project, and national projects vary widely
by virtue of history, geography, culture, and ideology. Put another way,
while the principle of equal citizenship remains elusive in every society, the
* Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I borrow my title, loosely, from SEYLA
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS (2004). I am grateful
to Sam Oliker-Friedland and David Kim for outstanding research assistance.
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pattern of the deviation from that principle may vary according to national
project. In the United States, national origin and ancestry discrimination
enjoy special, albeit uneven, protection, reflecting a political and social
consensus that such discrimination is inconsistent with the civic and legal
norms of equal treatment. But in other countries, similar forms of
discrimination may prove less inimical to the citizenship project.
Conversely, certain American practices may prove deeply offensive to other
countries’ citizenship ideals. In the first instance, then, the Indian visa
regime vis-à-vis Pakistani ancestry and the proposed terms of inclusion of
Israel within the U.S. visa waiver program reveal competing theoretical
understandings and empirical functions of citizenship.
These multiple theories and practices of citizenship intersect in the
seemingly mundane realm of visa policy—the regulated interchange of
citizens. When the screening or selection criteria of Country A offend the
citizenship values of Country B, Country B’s duties of equal protection to
its citizens are triggered. Indeed, the maintenance and fortification of
Country B’s national project demands the consistent defense of its
citizenship values. States will always define their own citizenship
categories, but in a world of constant international exchange, those
definitions also resonate internationally, creating opportunities to shape the
citizenships of other states. By expounding citizenship values in protection
of one’s own citizens, a state may also exert lasting influence on the
citizenship commitments of other nations. This can be done in the specific
context of national security considerations, but could be imagined in
relation to other state concerns as well. Moreover, as the mobility of
persons across state borders increases, we should expect competing
conceptions of citizenship to become mutually constitutive. Not unlike the
promotion of human rights, such deployment of a normative citizenship
runs all the risks of hegemony and claimed universality, even if not framed
in human rights terms. Leaving aside for the moment the normative
question of whether citizenship should be an object of statecraft, the visa
policy questions raised by the Indian and Israeli examples demonstrate its
availability as a tool for shaping global citizenship norms.
This Article begins with a description of the Indian and Israeli examples,
explaining the operation of the respective visa policies and how, in the
name of contemporary national security considerations, the policies enact
culturally specific, normative conceptions of citizenship embedded in the
deep structure of each country’s national project. The Article then
considers how the seemingly mundane universe of visa policy operates as a
site of conflict among competing normative visions of citizenship, and in
particular, the ways in which the Indian and Israeli policies threaten a
strong, albeit imperfect, American commitment to equal citizenship. The
Article concludes by arguing that an understanding of the particularities of
citizenship is necessary in order for countries such as the United States to
propagate norms of equal citizenship and its promise of universality.
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I. NATIONAL ORIGIN AND ANCESTRY DISCRIMINATION IN VISA POLICY:
TWO EXAMPLES
The liberal conception of citizenship promises equal treatment of all
citizens, without regard to other characteristics, including national origin or
ancestry. In U.S. law, protections against national origin and ancestry
discrimination are especially robust, extending formally to citizens and
noncitizens alike. But citizenship in its conventional form operates
nationally, and the rights of citizens of one country—whether rights to
protection against state intrusion1 or to healthcare or other forms of social
welfare—do not extend extraterritorially. The same is true with respect to
national notions of antidiscrimination, which, according to the liberal
model, should converge with citizenship itself.2 Thus, a citizen’s right of
freedom from state discrimination applies to her state alone.
In the realm of visa policy, states historically have enjoyed unfettered
authority, as questions of admission have been understood as integral to
sovereignty.3 While recent developments in international human rights law,
such as the principle of nonrefoulement,4 may begin to apply pressure on
these classical understandings, as an empirical matter, discrimination in the
issuance of visas remains a state’s prerogative. Countries, including the
United States, frequently discriminate on the basis of nationality, age,
ideology, and marital status.5 In the American context, such decisions are
1. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents “of
property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country”).
2. See ANUPAMA ROY, MAPPING CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA 8 (2010) (‘“Citizenship is a
status bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There
is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be but societies in
which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against
which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed.’”
(quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 29 (1950))).
3. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1158–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“In
prescribing the conditions for allowing aliens to enter the country, Congress [has] acted in
accordance with the ancient principle of international law that a nation state has the inherent
right to exclude or admit foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions. This
firmly-established principle, dating from Roman times, received recognition during the
Constitutional Convention and has continued to be an important postulate in the foreign
relations of this country and other members of the international community. For more than a
century, the Supreme Court has thus recognized the power to exclude aliens as ‘inherent in
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the
country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by
the political branches of government’ and not ‘granted away or restrained on behalf of
anyone.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972);
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (“No Contracting
State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”).
5. The case of Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss academic whose visa was revoked by the U.S.
government in 2004, and whose reapplication was denied in 2006, provides a recent and
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immune from judicial review under the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability.6
The two examples discussed here do not involve discrimination on the
basis of citizenship, but differential treatment of U.S. citizens on the basis
of national origin and ancestry, which entails the violation of American
norms of equal citizenship.
A. India’s Treatment of U.S. Citizens of Pakistani Descent
To apply for a visa to India, U.S. citizens must fill out an application,
submit payment, and await processing, first by a private company
contracted by the Indian government, and then by the local Indian
consulate. For most U.S. citizens, the process typically takes three to five
business days, if not fewer, and the consulate routinely grants multipleentry visas good for a period of years. However, a separate process governs
U.S. citizens of Pakistani descent: for these individuals, including both
naturalized U.S. citizens and citizens by birth, their applications require
approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi.7 The Indian
consulates state that this process requires a minimum of six weeks, though
in practice it often takes significantly longer; three to six months is not
uncommon. If such applications are approved, they typically permit only a
single entry, with a short expiry, and are stamped “US-PAK.” In force
since 2009, these special visa rules are well known among the PakistaniAmerican community, and likely operate to restrict the number of visas
granted to Americans of Pakistani descent. Similar restrictions apply to
British, Canadian, and Australian citizens of Pakistani descent.
India’s visa application inquires explicitly about place of birth and
ancestry, and Pakistani descent may be ascribed as far back as three
germane example. See Benjamin Weiser, Court Reverses Ruling Dealing with Visa of
Muslim Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A14 (describing the original allegations
against Ramadan and describing a decision by the Second Circuit that the government was
required to “confront Ramadan with the allegation against him and afford him the
subsequent opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not
know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a
terrorist organization”).
6. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159–60 (“In view of the political nature of visa
determinations and of the lack of any statute expressly authorizing judicial review of
consular officers’ actions, courts have applied what has become known as the doctrine of
consular nonreviewability. The doctrine holds that a consular official’s decision to issue or
withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise. For
the greater part of this century, our court has therefore refused to review visa decisions of
consular officials.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). Courts have recognized limited
exceptions to this rule. See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability, 42 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2009).
7. See Processing Time, INDIA VISA CENTER, https://indiavisa.travisaoutsourcing.com/
processing-times (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Visa Services, PASSPORT SEVA:
CONSULAR, PASSPORT & VISA DIVISION, MINISTRY EXTERNAL AFF., GOV’T INDIA,
http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/visaServices (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(noting a separate visa process for “Pakistani Nationals and Foreigners of Pak Origin” in
which a “Visa is granted to Pakistani nationals and foreigners of Pak origin only after
clearance by concerned authorities”).
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generations; the application requires applicants to disclose not only their
own place of birth, but also that of their parents and grandparents.8
Although Pakistan and India only became independent countries in 1947,
the logic of the visa application dictates that some applicants whose parents
or grandparents were born in British India—that is, before 1947—may
nonetheless be deemed of Pakistani descent. Thus, Pakistani identity
precedes Pakistan itself. Territory, distinct from and antecedent to, the
nation-state, becomes an object of suspicion.
The inquiry into national origin is not the only peculiarity of the Indian
visa application. Since 2010, the application also asks the applicant’s
religion, providing choices of: “Bahai, Buddhism, Christian, Hindu, Islam,
Others, Parsi, Sikh, Zoroastrian.”9 The religion question, like the questions
regarding national origin and ancestry, are required fields on the form.10
India and Pakistan have long restricted visas to one another’s citizens,11
and the loosening or tightening of visa availability is a familiar indicator of
bilateral relations between the two antagonists. Against this backdrop, it is
tempting to read these special visa rules as merely another political
instrument in the management of Indo-Pak relations. But the focus on
national origin and ancestry, rather than nationality, troubles this account.
Moreover, as I discuss below, the historical origins of the special visa rules
make clear that they are designed to address real or perceived national
security concerns about Americans and other westerners of Pakistani
descent.
The special visa rules were introduced in December 2009, in direct
response to the involvement of an American citizen, David Coleman
Headley, in the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008.12 Born Daood
8. The visa application requires disclosure of the applicant’s country of birth, current
nationality, any previously held nationality or dual citizenship, and the place of birth, current
nationality, and any previously held nationality of the applicant’s parents. See Visa
Application Form, BLS INT’L, http://www.visa.blsindia-usa.com/images/visasamp.gif (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014); see also Indian Visa Online, GOV’T INDIA, http://indianvisaonline.
gov.in/visa (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
9. See Visa Application Form, supra note 8.
10. Id.
11. In September 2012, India and Pakistan concluded an agreement to ease reciprocal
visa restrictions. This marked the first high-level diplomatic negotiations since the Mumbai
attacks in 2008. The agreement included steps such as multiple-entry visas for business
travelers and visas for children and adults over sixty-five upon arrival. Travel restrictions,
however, remain strict; business travelers, for example, must still apply for visas on a cityby-city basis. See, e.g., Salman Masood, India and Pakistan Sign Visa Agreement, Easing
Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, at A12; Haris Anwar and Augustine Anthony, India,
Pakistan Relax Visa Requirements As Part of Peace Process, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 9,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-09/india-pakistan-relax-visa-requirementsas-part-of-peace-process.html; see also Anita Joshua, India, Pakistan Ink Visa Agreement,
HINDU (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-pakistan-ink-visaagreement/article3874388.ece (deeming the new agreement “the first major overhaul since
1974”).
12. See Kavitha Rao, India Tightens Visa Rules, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 5, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/india-tightens-tourist-visa-rules/?_php=true&_
type=blogs&_r=0 (providing a description of the initial rules); see also Vibhuti Agarwal,
India Eases Tourist Visa Rules, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/

2046

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Gilani in Washington, D.C., to a Pakistani father and a white American
mother, David Headley admitted his central role in the planning of the 2008
Mumbai terrorist attacks.13 Previously a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
informant, Gilani also testified that he worked as an operative both for a
Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba, and for the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence Directorate (ISI).14 In 2005, Gilani changed his first
name, adopted his mother’s surname, Headley, and subsequently made
numerous trips to India on a multiple-entry visa in order to scout targets for
the attacks.15 Headley has since acknowledged that he changed his name in
order to deflect suspicion among Indian authorities, because, along with his
physical appearance and American-accented English, it would allow him to
pass as a white American rather than as Pakistani.16
In response to the attacks, the Indian government announced its new visa
policies. The policies included a mandatory sixty-day gap between entries
on a tourist visa, in-country registration requirements if the sixty-day gap
requirement is waived, and Home Ministry review prior to consular
approval for frequent tourist visa applicants.17 In addition, the new policies
provided for Home Ministry review and attendant delays of visa
applications for individuals of Pakistani ancestry, including U.S., Canadian,
British, and Australian citizens. The website of the High Commission of
India in Ottawa states the policies plainly, on a page titled “Visas to Persons
of Pakistani Origin”:
If you, or your parents or grandparents have/had Pak citizenship, a
different procedure will be applicable as mentioned below. Applicants
falling in this category may please note that visa granted to them shall be
for a short term, usually for a period of 3 months. It will be based on the
specific purpose of the visit and may be further restricted regarding the
duration and the places that can be visited in India.18

The policy also included greater restrictions for those currently holding
Pakistani nationality, including longer processing times, in-country
registration requirements, and restrictions on movement within India.19
indiarealtime/2012/12/04/india-eases-tourist-visa-rules/ (noting the relaxation of the initial
sixty-day gap requirement).
13. See A Guilty Plea to 2 Terrorism Charges, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A12; see
also Ginger Thompson, Mumbai Plotter Says Work for U.S. Drug Agency Provided Cover,
N.Y.TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A13.
14. See Thompson, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. See Mumbai-Attack Plotter Sentenced to 35 Years, AL JAZEERA, (Jan. 25, 2013,
10:13 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/01/20131258846436127.html
(“Headley changed his birth name from Daood Gilani in 2006 so he could travel to, and
from, India more easily to do reconnaissance without raising suspicions, videotaping and
mapping targets for the gunmen.”); see also Jane Perlez, American Terror Suspect Traveled
Unimpeded, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A1 (“Mr. Roty was able to use his Pakistani and
American heritage to great advantage, playing up his American descent on his mother’s side
in India, and then behaving as a Pakistani in Pakistan, where his father was born.”).
17. See Agarwal, supra note 12.
18. Visa to Persons of Pakistani Origin, HIGH COMMISSION INDIA OTTAWA, CAN.,
http://www.hciottawa.ca/pages.php?id=132 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
19. Id.
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Dual citizens of Pakistan and another country were deemed Pakistani
nationals for the purposes of the visa policy.20
Although the visa policies enacted delays rather than an outright travel
ban, the restrictions may effectively deter travel by individuals of Pakistani
descent, and the U.S. State Department has expressed this concern to the
Indian government. Its official statement is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State is aware that the Government of India
imposes different policies and requirements with regard to visa issuance
to applicants with Pakistani heritage, including U.S. citizens of Pakistani
ancestry. The Department has raised its concerns with the Embassy of
India in Washington, and the U.S. Embassy has also discussed the issue
with officials of the Government of India in New Delhi.
Unfortunately, the State Department is limited in its influence on
foreign government visa and immigration actions. Visas for travel to India
are issued only by Indian authorities and are entirely under the purview of
Indian laws, regulations, and procedures. It is the sovereign prerogative
of any country—including India and the United States—to issue or deny
entry visas and to set the terms under which those decisions will be
made.21

The foregoing statement reveals the conundrum created by the Indian visa
policy. On the one hand, the visa policy offends an American principle of
equal citizenship that the State Department is eager to defend. On the other,
the Indian policy exercises the sovereign prerogative to regulate entry, a
prerogative that the United States not only recognizes with respect to India,
but also strongly desires to preserve for itself.
The long history of enmity and suspicion between India and Pakistan,
dating nearly to the countries’ births, refreshed through multiple wars and
border crises, and exploited by nationalist movements in both countries, has
rendered each state vigilant to infiltration by the other.22 The fear of
infiltration has been heightened by the commonality of racial phenotype,
language, and religious and cultural practices among citizens of both
countries—the natural consequence of the Partition of British colonial India
into the modern states of India and Pakistan.23 But the Headley case
20. Id.
21. Nisha Biswal, Response to Twitter Question on Indian Visa’s, U.S. DEPARTMENT
ST.: BUREAU S. & CENT. ASIAN AFF. (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:06 PM), https://www.facebook.com/
notes/us-department-of-state-bureau-of-south-and-central-asian-affairs/response-to-twitterquestion-on-indian-visas/284915471568447.
22. See, e.g., YASMIN KHAN, THE GREAT PARTITION 195 (2007) (“A natural corollary to
the empirical confusions surrounding Pakistan’s territorial extent and Pakistan’s intrinsic
meaning was that it took a long time for people to come to grips with the idea of India and
Pakistan as separate sovereign lands . . . . The system of entry and exit permits, which began
as a logical attempt to regulate the refugee flow, soon turned into a restrictive administrative
regime which became self-sustaining. Now the aim was to keep out terrorists and enemies
of the state . . . . Most of all, the governments needed to pin down precisely who was an
Indian and who was a Pakistani. There was no room for ambiguities or uncertain gray
areas.”).
23. See id. at 81 (noting that the Punjab region before Partition “had its own distinctive
culture and its own strategic importance, and was both the birthplace of Sikhism and home to

2048

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

introduced the specter of a different kind of enemy to the Indian state: one
who could pass not as Indian—a challenge with which the Indian security
apparatus has decades of experience—but as American.
The Headley rules reflect an anxiety shared by the West after the attacks
of September 11, 2001: fear of the non-terrorist-looking terrorists, a
category that is itself overdetermined by more than a decade of racial,
religious, and national associations with terrorism. The Headley case is an
example of the adaptive enemy, adjusting its tactics in response to
antiterrorism measures that rely on traditional forms of profiling. By this
account, the Headley rules are the (Indian) state’s counter-adaptation,
deploying national origin and ancestry where racial phenotype, religious
identification, language, and nationality—as distinct from national origin—
prove insufficient markers of terrorist threat.
Although created in response to the Headley affair, the Indian visa policy
has been enacted against a backdrop of longstanding suspicion of Pakistan,
which, the policy suggests, has helped to construct Pakistani as not just a
nationality, but also an ethnicity. The assimilation of dual nationals into the
category of Pakistani citizens is less troubling in this regard, since the
maintenance of Pakistani citizenship reflects a choice of the dual national to
retain affiliation with, and loyalty to, the Pakistani state. The ascription of
Pakistani identity down to the second, or even third, generation of a
Pakistani national, however, transforms the nationality into an ethnic
attribution—this attribution descends automatically, even to an individual
who is one-fourth of Pakistani origin (and even if that Pakistani origin
precedes the existence of Pakistan itself).24 By this account, “Pakistan” is
rendered an immutable characteristic and a permanent threat, requiring
constant Indian vigilance. Moreover, the ascription of Pakistani ethnicity
on the basis of bloodline posits a fundamentally ethnic vision of not only
Pakistani citizenship, but by implication, Indian citizenship as well.
The Indian construction of Pakistani ethnicity is inextricable from
Muslim identity, given the virtual equation of Pakistan and Islam in the
Indian imagination. Such an equation is to be expected, as Pakistan was
formed as a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent, and the state has
engaged in decades of religiously based self-construction and differentiation
from the Hindu-majority India, even as India has experimented with Hindu
nationalism.25 The recurrent entanglement of Pakistan and India in
a closely knitted Punjabi-speaking population of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims”). For a
general introduction to the history and politics of Partition, see RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA
AFTER GANDHI 19–51 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Visa to Persons of Pakistani Origin, supra note 18. The text plainly
reveals that Pakistani origin is a determination based on “citizenship” (rather than the racial
or ethnic status) of the applicant’s parents and grandparents). Furthermore, the description
of Pakistani as a category of ethnicity within South Asia is in many respects inapposite, as
more traditionally defined, sub-national ethnic groups exist across the Pakistani-Indian
border. For example, Punjabis—the most populous ethnic group in Pakistan—exist in both
countries by virtue of Partition, and share a common language, pre-independence history,
and cultural traditions, notwithstanding their religious differences.
25. The history of Indian and Pakistani constructions of national identity predicated on
religious affiliation is long and varied—indeed, coextensive with the formal existence of
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Kashmir likewise has fortified an understanding of Pakistani ethnicity as
fundamentally Islamic. Thus, the “Islamic threat” of the Pakistani is not a
post-9/11 construction, but instead has been an indigenous, longstanding
feature of Indo-Pak relations, a fact that is supported by the broadly held
view that the Mumbai attacks featured the involvement of the Pakistani
state (and, in particular, elements of the ISI), rather than non-state actors
alone.26
Notably, the tightening of visa restrictions with respect to Americans of
Pakistani descent has been accompanied by a relaxation of restrictions with
respect to the Indian diaspora. Through a series of policy initiatives
designed to attract diasporic investment in India, the state has created
special visa pathways for foreign nationals of Indian origin. Most recently,
in 2003, India introduced the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) status, which
grants various benefits, including a “multiple entry, multiple purpose, lifelong visa for visiting India,”27 freedom from the ordinary requirement to
register with immigration authorities, the ability to hold property, and
preferential treatment for adoption from India.28 And while its name
those two countries. See, e.g., KHAN supra note 22, at 175–76 (“[A]s refugees arrived in
India and Pakistan they were encouraged to see themselves in a new light—to set aside their
hardships momentarily and to appreciate that they now, after all, independent citizens of free
countries . . . . [In Pakistan, t]he victims of Partition violence were called shahids and
bathed in the language of martyrdom . . . . Partition quickly became repackaged as a war of
liberation . . . . In northern India, the Hindu Right, particularly the RSS [Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh] and the Hindu Mahasabha, which had played such a provocative role
in the months leading up to Partition, and had been hand in glove with violent rioters all
along, now swung firmly behind the refugee cause.”). For a brief introduction to current
controversies over Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, and Narendra Modi, see Sambuddha
Mitra Mustafi, What Makes Narendra Modi a Middle-Class Hero?, N.Y. TIMES, (May 16,
2013, 1:45 AM), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/what-makes-narendra-modi-amiddle-class-hero/. See also Victor Mallet & Barney Jopson, US To End Boycott of India’s
Narendra Modi Ahead of Election, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 5:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/526c00d2-92d3-11e3-8018-00144feab7de.html#axzz2tv3RfA4X.
26. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27. Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme, MINISTRY OVERSEAS INDIAN AFF.,
http://moia.gov.in/services.aspx?id1=35&id=m3&idp=35&mainid=23 (last visited Mar. 25,
2014).
28. A registered OCI is entitled to “parity with Non-Resident Indians in respect of all
facilities available to them in economic, financial and educational fields except in matters
relating to the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In particular, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs indicates that OCIs
enjoy the following benefits:
a. Parity with Non-Resident Indians in the matter of inter-country adoption of
Indian children;
b. Parity with resident Indian nationals in matters of tariffs in domestic air fares;
c. Parity with domestic Indian visitors in respect of entry fee for visiting national
parks and wildlife sanctuaries in India;
d. Parity with non-resident Indians in respect of:
i. Entry fees for visiting the national monuments, historical sites and
museums in India;
ii. Practicing the following professions in India . . . :

Doctors, dentists, nurses and pharmacists;

Advocates;

Architects; and

Chartered Accountants; and
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purports to afford these benefits to “Citizen[s] of India,” the OCI status is in
fact reserved for foreign nationals of Indian descent, thus blurring the
traditional citizen-noncitizen dichotomy, providing a qualified form of dual
citizenship, and introducing a multiplicity of state citizenship practices.
In fact, the definition of OCI mirrors almost exactly India’s definition of
Pakistani descent, suggesting that foreign nationals of Pakistani descent are
viewed by the Indian state as “Overseas Citizens of Pakistan.”29 Under a
2005 law, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act,30 OCI status may be granted
to any individual who was eligible for Indian citizenship on the date that the
Indian constitution became effective (January 26, 1950), belonged to
territories that became India at Partition (August 15, 1947), or became
citizens after enactment of the constitution.31 OCI status is also available to
individuals whose parents or grandparents meet one of these three
requirements.32 Those who have ever held Pakistani or Bangladeshi
citizenship are ineligible.33 Thus, “Indianness” is constructed to extend
back up to three generations, the same as India’s construction of the
Pakistani. The Indian and the Pakistani are thus constructed as each other’s
inverse—as essential, immutable, and oppositional categories, recalling
Etienne Balibar’s characterization of the “lesson of alterity,” according to
which modern conceptions of citizenship rely upon “otherness as an
indispensable element of its own identity, its virtuality, its ‘power.’”34
The legal inscription of Indian citizenship is inextricable from Partition.
The first definitions of Indian citizenship, in the constitution of 1950, give
substantial attention to the granting of citizenship to migrants from
Pakistan.35 Indeed, the citizenship chapter of the constitution establishes
the template for determining India’s contemporary understanding of the
Pakistani and the OCI construction of the Indian. The constitution reflects
multiple approaches to citizenship: jus soli, jus sanguinis, and a partial

e. Entitlement to appear for the All India Pre-Medical Test or such other tests to
make them eligible for admission in pursuance of the provisions contained in
the relevant Acts.
Id.
29. See id.
30. 2005, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
31. Id. § 4(a)(i)–(iii).
32. Id. § 4(a)(iv).
33. Id. § 4(b).
34. Sandro Mezzadra, Citizen and Subject: A Postcolonial Constitution for the
European Union?, 1 SITUATIONS: PROJECT RADICAL IMAGINATION 31, 31 (2006),
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/situations/article/view/22/31 (translating ETIENNE BALIBAR,
L’EUROPE, L’AMÉRIQUE, LA GUERRE: RÉFLEXIONS SUR LA MÉDIATION EUROPÉENE 38–39
(2003) (“À la leçon d’ordre public issue de l’histoire européenne s’en ajoute ainsi une autre,
qu’on pourrait appeler une leçon d’altérité, ou une reconnaissance (même hésitante,
contrainte, conflictuelle) par l’Europe de l’altérité comme composante indispensable de sa
propre identité, de sa propre virtualité, en clair de sa propre «puissance».”)).
35. See Anupama Roy, Between Encompassment and Closure: The ‘Migrant’ and the
Citizen in India, 42 CONTRIBUTIONS INDIAN SOC. 219, 222 (2008) (“[Partition is] the primary
context within which citizenship gets enframed in the Indian Republic.”).
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deterritorialization.36 First, it confers citizenship on individuals who, at the
commencement of the constitution, were domiciled in the territory of India,
and (a) were born in the territory of India, (b) either of whose parents were
born in the territory of India, or (c) have been “ordinarily resident” in the
territory of India for a period of five years preceding the commencement of
the constitution.37 These provisions seek to capture those “found” in India
soon after its independence38 and render them from colonial subjects to
citizens of the state. They do so through a combination of jus soli, jus
sanguinis, and territorial presence. Second, the constitution confers
citizenship on certain migrants to India from territories that became
Pakistan. Article 6 of the citizenship chapter deems, as citizens of India, (as
of the commencement of the constitution) individuals who migrated from
the territory of Pakistan, and who either themselves, their parents, or their
grandparents were born in pre-Partition India.39 Article 7 authorizes the
conferring of citizenship on migrants from India to Pakistan, who
subsequently returned under permits for resettlement or permanent return.40
Taken together, Articles 6 and 7 reflect the imperative to contend with the
massive migration of Partition; migration from Pakistan was, literally,
constitutive of the nation, and demanded rules to render the trauma and
messiness of Partition intelligible to the state. Finally, Article 8 authorizes
citizenship for “persons of Indian origin” residing outside of India, once
again employing a trigenerational test: any individual who was born in the
territory of pre-independence India, or whose parents or grandparents were
so born, and who is resident in another country, is eligible for citizenship
Article 8 represents the most complete
through registration.41
deterritorialization of citizenship within the constitution, as it requires no
residence in India, and at its furthest reach, requires only the birth of a
grandparent within pre-independence India (including the territories that
became Pakistan). At the same time, Article 8 also encompassed colonial
subjects resident in other British colonies, and as such represents an ethnic
model of citizenship.
As Valerian Rodrigues has argued, the constitutional structure of
citizenship was expansive, eschewed strict territorial or ethnic ascription,
and honored associational choice.42 Associational choice is most clearly
36. See Anupama Roy, Overseas Indian Citizen: A New ‘Setubhandan’?, 41 ECON. &
POL. WEEKLY 1421, 1422 (2006).
37. INDIA CONST. art. 5.
38. ROY, supra note 2, at 36.
39. Article 6 also draws a distinction between those individuals who migrated to India
before July 19, 1948, and those who migrated on or after that date. In order to be deemed a
citizen, an individual in the former category must have been “ordinarily resident in the
territory of India since the date of his migration . . . .” Those in the latter category must have
been registered as a citizen of India before the “commencement” of the Constitution.
Registration was possible only after a residency of at least six months in duration
“immediately preceding” the date of application. See INDIA CONST. art. 6.
40. Id. art. 7.
41. Id. art. 8.
42. See Valerian Rodrigues, Citizenship and the Indian Constitution, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
PUBLIC SPHERE, AND CITIZENSHIP: DIALOGUES AND PERCEPTIONS 214 (Rajeev Bhargava &
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reflected in Articles 6 and 7, and yet these provisions are not entirely free of
ascription. Rather, the trigenerational eligibility rule still serves to define
Indian ancestry, even if such ancestry does not automatically confer Indian
citizenship; only the volitional act of migration to the territory of India, in
combination with Indian ancestry, results in the conferring of citizenship.
This same combination of ascription and volition repeats in Article 8, which
requires that individuals of Indian ancestry—defined, once more, by a
trigenerational rule—affirmatively apply with the Indian government for
registration as citizens.43
The original constitutional structure of Indian citizenship thus reflects
three distinct foundational concerns: transforming colonial subjects of
Great Britain into citizens of the Indian state; incorporating migrants from
Pakistan in the period of Partition into India; and demarcating Indian
citizenship from Pakistani citizenship (and, by extension, India from
Pakistan). These goals are met through an imbricated system of jus soli and
jus sanguinis, ascription and volition. By virtue of the histories of British
colonialism, the independence movement that cleaved India, and the mass
migration of Partition, the citizenship moves expressed in the constitution
were essential to nascent India’s national project. Unsurprisingly, the
constitution’s foundational definitions of citizenship prefigure the state’s
contemporary definitions of Indian and Pakistani citizenship.
As Anupama Roy has shown, the emergence of OCI status is consistent
with a trend in India toward an ethnic model of citizenship.44 Roy observes
that the constitution conceived of citizenship in both ethnic and
associational terms, conjuring a membership status that included both a
territorially defined class and a migrant population that elected to join that
class.45 The ethnic dimension of Indian citizenship has, however, grown
considerably in recent years. The Citizenship Act of 1955 provided for
unrestricted jus soli citizenship for anyone born in India from the date of
enactment of the constitution onward, but a 1986 amendment to the Act,
created to restrict the granting of citizenship to children of migrants from
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Africa, limited jus soli to those with at least one
Indian citizen parent.46 A 2003 amendment, which also created the OCI
status, further restricted jus soli to individuals whose parents were both
Indian citizens, or to those with only one citizen parent, so long as the other
parent was not an “illegal migrant” at the time of the individual’s birth.47
Helmut Reifeld eds., 2005) (noting that “the draft articles [of the constitution], both as they
were initially proposed, and in their final version too, had some pronounced features which
could be termed secular, understood as non-preference to any and inclusion of all relevant
communities or groups,” and, further, “[w]hile accepting the fact that people were embedded
in identities, [the constitution] grounded citizenship on principles that, while not reducible to
them, were at the same time related to [those identities]”); see also ROY, supra note 2, at 39–
40.
43. See INDIA CONST. art. 8.
44. See generally Roy, supra note 36.
45. Roy, supra note 36, at 1421–22.
46. See ROY, supra note 2, at 138; Roy, supra note 36, at 1422.
47. “Illegal migrant” is defined as “a foreigner who has entered into India (i) without a
valid passport or other travel documents and such other document or authority as may be
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Meanwhile, a 1992 amendment expanded upon the Act’s original grant of
patrilineal jus sanguinis citizenship by making citizenship available to
individuals born outside of India to an Indian citizen father, even if the
father himself only acquired citizenship through descent.48 The trend is
thus toward a restriction on citizenship by birth and an expansion of
citizenship by descent.
Citizenship by descent, in turn, forces a
convergence of Indian ethnicity and Indian citizenship, as evident from the
intent to exclude Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Africans in the 1986
amendment—once more reviving Balibar’s “lesson of otherness”—and as
reinforced by the ascription of a deterritorialized citizenship to the OCI.49
The introduction of the OCI status in 2003 is a particular kind of
deterritorialization of citizenship. Deterritorialization is typically associated
with the claiming or granting of rights by or to undocumented workers or
other irregular migrants, supplanting the privity between state and citizen
on which traditional notions of citizenship rely with a notion of informal
social contract borne of territorial presence and civic practice.50 The OCI
program works in the other direction, extending the status-granting,
identity-making reach of the state outside of its territorial boundary in order
to recapture a diaspora and harness it for national gain. Both moves should
be expected in the current moment of globalization, as states compete for
the benefits of migration and simultaneously seek to insulate themselves
from its costs.
As Roy points out, the OCI category was initially limited to people of
Indian origin in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore, and Thailand, prompting Fatima Meer, a South African, to dub it
a “[d]ollar and pound citizenship.”51 But the cultural nationalism of the
OCI program is at least as strong as the economic. Even when the program
was expanded in 2005, it excluded citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh,
thus recapitulating the foundational definition of Indian citizenship. But as
Roy writes:

prescribed by or under any law in that behalf; or (ii) with a valid passport or other travel
documents and such other document or authority as may be prescribed by or under any law
in that behalf but remains therein beyond the permitted period of time”. The Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2003, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2004 (India).
48. See Rodrigues, supra note 42, at 216 (noting the overarching trend toward more
restrictive citizenship criteria and underscoring that “successive amendments to [the
Citizenship] Act narrowly circumscribed birth as entitling one to citizenship, and birth came
emphatically to be qualified by ethnic belonging. The open and inclusive approach to
citizenship reflected in the constitution gave way to a pronounced sense of insularity”).
49. See ROY, supra note 2, at 136–37 (noting the increase in scholarly theorization of the
“changed socio-historical realities of an increasingly globalized, interdependent, and interconnected world, characterized by transnational migrations and multicultural populations
rather than by bounded national communities,” which give rise to an apparently
“transcendental” citizenship); see also BALIBAR, supra note 34.
50. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and
Spaces for Politics, 46 BERKELEY J. SOC. 4, 5–12 (2002).
51. C. Rammanohar Reddy, Citizenship with Dollars and Pounds, HINDU (Jan. 19,
2003), http://www.hindu.com/mag/2003/01/19/stories/2003011900230300.htm.
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Not only did the OCI then sustain the original contexts of nation-state
citizenship framed at the time of Partition, it also manifested the dominant
political and ideological contexts of Hindutva [Hindu nationalism] within
which the category was made effective, the official process of instituting
the category having been completed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
dominated National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government . . . . [T]he
overseas citizenship of India was hegemonically marked, constituting all
persons of Indian origin, wherever in the world they were, as Hindus,
since their punya bhumi [homeland] remained India.52

By this account, the Indian’s other is not the Pakistani, but the Muslim, a
familiar theme in the subcontinent dating back to Partition.53
The Muslim in India has been, and continues to be, a vexing figure. In
the immediate aftermath of Partition, Muslims were deemed “suspect as
open or closet Pakistanis,” having been “too much involved in the Muslim
League demand for Pakistan: their sympathies were not likely to change
overnight, and their loyalty could not be counted upon.”54 Questions of
loyalty and fears of complicity with Pakistan or infiltration by Pakistanis
have animated modern Indian history, from Partition to Kashmir to the
Headley affair. It is, therefore, among these historical circumstances that
Indian notions of citizenship—the citizenship of Indians and the citizenship
of others—must be evaluated. As the Indian’s other, the Pakistani—nearly
equated with the Muslim—is a permanent object of suspicion. Just as the
physical boundaries of India and Pakistan have been reified, so too have
Indian and Pakistani identities been reinscribed. Between the Headley rules
on the one hand, and the developments in Indian citizenship practices on the
other, we can see the convergence of national security and cultural
nationalist concerns, each following a logic of ethnic citizenship. The
Pakistani and the Indian are once more opposed through ascriptions of
citizenship that predate the nationalities as a historical matter, and which
suggest their essential and permanent nature.
Differentiation from the Pakistani is thus part of the deep structure of
citizenship in India. The contemporary reliance on national origin and
ancestry is inseparable from the nation-building project of postindependence India and reflects India’s newly resurgent ethno-national
model of citizenship. Rooted in the foundational trauma of Partition, and
fueled by religious and cultural nationalism within India and Pakistan, the
imperative to differentiation has assumed new relevance within India
following September 11 and the Mumbai attacks. In this context, as at
Partition, ancestry is constitutive of Indian understandings of citizenship
rather than antithetical to them.55
52. Roy, supra note 35, at 239.
53. Gyanendra Pandey, Can a Muslim Be an Indian?, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 608,
615 (1999).
54. Id.
55. The figure of the migrant has also been transformed since independence. Whereas
Partition created an imperative for the state to identify and incorporate the migrant, this
moment of incorporation was finite; as the constitution provided, migrants from territory that
became Pakistan were eligible for citizenship only until the date of commencement of the
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B. The Israel Visa Waiver Program Controversy
In March 2013, companion bills were introduced in the House and
Senate, both titled the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of
2013.56 With 351 cosponsors in the House57 and fifty-three in the Senate,58
the bills declare Israel a “major strategic partner”59 of the United States.
They include provisions for continued support of Israeli defense programs
and expanded cooperation between the two countries on matters of defense,
military and sensitive technology-related trade, energy, water, and
agriculture. The bills also promote Israel’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver
Program, engendering considerable opposition because of Israel’s disparate
treatment of U.S. citizens of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim descent.60
The Visa Waiver Program began as a pilot program in 1986.61 Originally
limited to eight countries,62 it exempts the citizens of program-participant
countries from the requirement to obtain from the State Department a
nonimmigrant visa for business or tourist travel to the United States for up
to ninety days.63 The program has been amended numerous times since
1986, was made permanent in 2000,64 and has now expanded to include

constitution. Thus, the constitution established a window of time in which migration was a
basis for citizenship. Decades later, migration became oppositional to citizenship rather than
a pathway to it. See supra note 39; see also Roy, supra note 35, at 234 (describing the Illegal
Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1983 (India),
invalidated by Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 665 (India), which
“stressed that ‘special provisions for the detection of such foreigners in Assam and also in
any other part of India in which such foreigners may be found to have remained illegally’
was necessary for ‘protecting the citizens of India’”); id. at 236 (characterizing the supreme
court decision that struck down the Illegal Migrants Act as itself “manifest[ing] a trend
towards the entrenchment of a notion of citizenship marked by cultural ascriptions which
had almost imperceptibly crept into the Citizenship Act with the amendment in 1986”).
56. United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, S. Con. Res. 462, 113th
Cong. (2013).
57. H.R.938—United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV,
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/938 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
58. Id.
59. See H.R. 938, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); S. 462, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). If enacted,
Israel would be the only country to which this designation would apply.
60. See, e.g., Letter from Azadeh N. Shahshahani, President, Nat’l Lawyers Guild, to
Sen. Barbara Boxer (June 26, 2013), available at http://www.nlginternational.org/report/
NLG_letter-SB_462.pdf; Ali Gharib and George Hale, Critics Fear Visa Waiver for Israel
Glosses over Discrimination Against Americans, DAILY BEAST (May 16, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/16/critics-fear-visa-waiver-for-israel-glossesover-discrimination-against-americans.html.
61. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program was contained in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 313, 100 Stat. 3359, 3435.
62. The first country designated by the U.S. State Department was the United Kingdom,
on July 1, 1988. During 1988 and 1989, the following countries were added to the pilot (in
chronological order): Japan, France, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands. Visas: Passports and Visas Not Required for Certain
Nonimmigrants, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,120 (June 27, 1989) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 41 (2013)).
63. 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(1) (2012).
64. Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637 (2000)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2012)).
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thirty-seven countries.65 The requirements for admission to the program
were amended most recently via the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007.66 Approximately 40 percent of all overseas
visitors enter the United States via the program.67 Many countries actively
seek admission to the program in order to promote tourism and
commerce.68 It is also understood as an expression of amity between the
United States and member countries.69
Whereas visitors to the United States ordinarily must obtain a visa from
an overseas U.S. consular post and are typically subject to in-person
interviews and screening and must pay a processing fee, the Visa Waiver
Program relieves visitors of the documentary, interview, and financial
burdens attendant to nonimmigrant “B” visas.70 Ordinary visa processing
takes into account a broad range of factors, including whether the applicant
meets a ground of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the likelihood that the applicant will overstay the visa, and whether the
applicant is in one of a number of “lookout” databases of people deemed a
threat to the United States.71 For participating countries, the Visa Waiver
Program replaces these individualized assessments with a far less onerous
application process, one that functions effectively as a presumption in favor
of admission.72 The criteria for admission to the program restrict it to “high
volume/low risk” countries,73 whose nationals likely would be granted
visitor visas through the ordinary process, and which otherwise agree to
forms of cooperation with the United States designed to approximate the
same security interests as individualized assessments.
By statute, the program is limited to countries that have historically low
rates of nonimmigrant visa refusals, adopt certain technologies such as
machine-readable passports and visa documents that incorporate biometric
65. The Visa Waiver Program currently designates: Andorra, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, San
Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. 8 C.F.R. § 217.2.
66. Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 711, 121 Stat. 266, 388 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187). As the
Foreign Affairs Manual summarizes, the program has been amended six times, including the
2007 amendments. In 1990, the eight-country cap was removed, and the program was
reauthorized until 1994. In 1994, the program was reauthorized until 1996, and a
probationary status for prospective participant countries was added. In 1996, the
probationary status option was removed, and the program was reauthorized until 1997. In
1998, the program was reauthorized again until 2000, when the Visa Waiver Permanent
Program Act made the program permanent. 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL § 41.2 N10 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
87159.pdf.
67. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 9 (2014).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 12.
70. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 13
(2013).
71. SISKIN, supra note 67, at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
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identifiers, enter into information-sharing agreements with the United States
regarding loss or theft of passports or possible threats to U.S. security or
welfare, and accept the streamlined repatriation of its citizens, former
citizens, and nationals, against whom a final order of removal is issued.74
In addition, a participating country must offer “reciprocal privileges” to the
United States,75 and the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Department of State, must determine that the law enforcement and
security interests of the United States would not be undermined by the
country’s inclusion.76
Whereas on one level the Visa Waiver Program is merely a matter of
administrative convenience, for visitors and the countries they visit alike, it
is also understood as an expression of strategic partnership and amity
between the United States and member countries. As President George W.
Bush stated in 2008 when announcing the addition of the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Slovakia, and South Korea to the program, “Today’s
announcement signifies a new chapter in the relationship between the
United States and your nations. It is a testament to the strong bonds of
friendship that unite our people.”77 Unsurprisingly, inclusion of countries
in the program is an instrument of foreign policy, as reflected in the
strategic significance of the three former Soviet-bloc countries and South
Korea, and is understood as such by many countries.78 In 2006, for
example, then President Vaclav Havel wrote to President Bush urging
inclusion of the Czech Republic in the program, arguing that doing so
would “remove what Czechs feel is an unfortunate relic of the Cold War
that no longer belongs in the modern Czech-U.S. alliance.”79 As a recent

74. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c) (2012).
75. Id. § 1187(a)(2)(A).
76. Id. § 1187(c).
77. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President on the Visa Waiver Program
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2008/10/
20081017125306eaifas0.1320612.html#axzz2rztsq58a.
78. Both Congress and the Executive have treated inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program
as a foreign policy tool. As a Government Accountability Office (GAO) letter to Congress
on the Visa Waiver Program documented in 2006, members of Congress have sought
inclusion of particular countries, such as Poland and South Korea, in the program for policy
reasons. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-835R, PROCESS FOR ADMITTING
ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES INTO THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 3 (2006). In 2005, President Bush
announced the “Road Map Initiative,” to assist additional countries in meeting the
requirements to join the program. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-967, VISA
WAIVER PROGRAM: ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF THE EXPANSION
PROCESS, AND TO ASSESS AND MITIGATE PROGRAM RISKS 16 (2008). As the GAO reported in
2008, “According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some of these countries
are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have high expectations that they will join the
program due to their close economic, political, and military ties to the United States.” Id. at
3. In 2006, the Senate passed, but did not enact, a comprehensive immigration reform bill
that included a section to expand the program to countries providing material support to the
United States or the multilateral forces in Afghanistan or Iraq. Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 413.
79. Daniel Griswold, Expand Visa Waiver Program to Qualified Countries, 26 FREE
TRADE BULL. 3 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/FTB-026.pdf (quoting letter on file with author).
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Congressional Research Service report notes, “[T]he leaders and publics in
many new EU members, such as Poland, are reportedly unhappy with their
exclusion from the VWP given their support of controversial U.S. policies
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the fight against terrorism.”80 In many cases,
inclusion in the program may also serve as an American endorsement of the
democratic bona fides of participating countries. For example, a White
House statement entitled “U.S.-Chile Partnership” notes the “deep historical
partnership” between the two countries, as “close partners and vibrant
democracies,” and includes the State Department’s nomination of Chile to
the Visa Waiver Program in a list of cooperation agreements.81 Thus, the
symbolic value of the program, and not just the ease of travel it affords,
makes it a coveted status for many countries. In light of the foreign policy
role that the Visa Waiver Program has played historically, it is not
surprising that the proposal to include Israel in the program would be
included in a bill designed to promote Israel as a “major strategic
partner.”82
The legitimizing effects of the Visa Waiver Program are embedded in its
reciprocity requirement. The statutory requirement that member countries
provide “reciprocal privileges” to U.S. citizens and nationals implies an
equality of status among Americans and the citizens of other countries. As
Havel wrote in his letter to President Bush regarding inclusion of the Czech
Republic in the program, “It . . . allows you to demonstrate to an
emancipated and self-confident ally the renowned U.S. spirit of equality
and fair play.”83 At a minimum, reciprocity in the context of the Visa
Waiver Program means “visa-free travel” for U.S. citizens and those of the
member country.84 But the broad language of the statute—requiring
“reciprocal privileges to citizens and nationals of the United States”—
implies that visa-free travel must also be travel free of discrimination,
because citizenship, by its liberal meaning, does not permit differentiation
among its members, the language of the statute necessarily requires the
extension of reciprocal privileges to all U.S. citizens.85
Although Israel would not meet the program’s current visa refusal rate
requirement—the statute requires a rate of no more than 3 percent,86 and the

80. SISKIN, supra note 70 at 13; see also Craig Whitlock, Poland’s Leader Hopes To
Gain from Support of U.S. Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A15.
81. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Chile Partnership (June 4, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-us-chilepartnership.
82. See United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013, H.R. 938, 113th Cong.
§ 3 (2013) (“Congress declares that Israel is a major strategic partner of the United States.”).
83. Griswold, supra note 79, at 3.
84. See, e.g., 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 66.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(2)(A) (2012).
86. The statute requires either (a) a visa refusal rate of less than 2 percent during the two
previous fiscal years combined and less than 2.5 percent in each of the previous two fiscal
years, or (b) a visa refusal rate during the immediately previous fiscal year of less than 3
percent. Id. § 1187(c)(2)(A).
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rate for Israel in fiscal year 2013 was 9.7 percent87—Israel’s treatment of
American Muslims and Americans of Arab and Palestinian descent has
proven the main obstacle to inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program because
of the reciprocity requirement. For decades, advocates have documented
concerns with Israel’s treatment of Muslim Americans, Arab Americans,
and Palestinian Americans.88 These have included “complaints of hundreds
of American[s] of Arab descent who, upon entering Israel or the Occupied
Territories, have reported being: detained for hours of humiliating
questioning; forced against their will to secure a Palestinian passport; strip
searched; forced to surrender cameras, computers, or phones (some of
which have been destroyed or not returned); or denied entry and forced to
buy a return ticket back to the U.S.”89 In June 2013, sixteen members of
Congress wrote a letter to the Israeli ambassador to the U.S. expressing
concern that Israel was “‘disproportionately singling out, detaining and
denying entry to Arab and Muslim Americans.’”90
The U.S. State Department similarly has documented unequal treatment
of U.S. citizens. In its country report for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza,
the State Department begins with a statement of its commitment to equal
citizenship: “The U.S. government seeks equal treatment and freedom to
travel for all U.S. citizens regardless of national origin or ethnicity.”91 Yet
whereas Israeli-American nationals are treated by Israel as Israeli at the port
of entry, the report continues, “U.S. citizens who are or may be PalestinianAmerican (PA) dual nationals are treated as Palestinian nationals at the port
of entry.”92 Moreover, “[t]hose with extensive travel to Muslim countries
or U.S. citizens whom Israeli authorities suspect of being of Arab, Middle

87. Adjusted Refusal Rate—B-Visas Only by Nationality, Fiscal Year 2013,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Non-ImmigrantStatistics/RefusalRates/FY13.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). In brief, the refusal rate is
calculated by dividing total visa refusals (not counting an applicant who was initially denied
but later approved the same year) by the total number of refusals and issuances. Calculation
of the Adjusted Visa Refusal Rate for Tourist and Business Travelers Under the Guidelines
of the Visa Waiver Program, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
Statistics/Non-Immigrant-Statistics/refusalratelanguage.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
Note that “overcomes,” where an officer “has the information he needs to overcome a refusal
but has not processed the case to completion,” are not included in the numerator or
denominator. Id.
88. See, e.g., James Zogby, Congress Should Not Reward Israel with Visa Waivers,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/congressshould-not-rewar_b_3122128.html; see also SISKIN, supra note 67, at 15.
89. Zogby, supra note 88. Other reports include requiring U.S. citizens of Palestinian
descent to disclose email passwords in order to gain admission to the country. See Yousef
Munayyer, A Lopsided U.S. Visa-Waiver, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2013, at 9.
90. See Friction Expected on Israel-US Visa Measure, BOS. GLOBE (July 16, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/07/16/congress-administration-disagreeisraeli-visas/Al9SiaeBJzAPc4qB7WDIRJ/story.html.
91. Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, U.S. PASSPORTS & INT’L TRAVEL,
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/israel.html (last updated Feb. 6,
2014).
92. Id.
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Eastern, or Muslim origin may face additional questioning by immigration
and border authorities.”93
The prefatory statement of principle in the State Department report
announces the issue as one of discrimination on the basis of national origin
and ancestry.94 In fact, national origin and ancestry discrimination are
operating in at least two distinct ways. First, Israel ascribes Palestinian
identity not only to those who hold both a U.S. passport and a PA
identification, but to those U.S. citizens who may be eligible for a PA
identification, even if they do not possess one.95 As the report states,
“Israeli authorities consider anyone who has parents or grandparents who
were born or lived in the West Bank or Gaza to have a claim to a PA ID.”96
The effect is for the Israeli government, and not the Palestinian Authority,
to determine, on the basis of ancestry, who is Palestinian, and by
implication, for the Israeli government rather than the United States to
determine who is an American citizen. Second, according to the State
Department, Israel gives enhanced scrutiny to U.S. citizens “whom Israeli
authorities suspect of being of Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim origin.”97
Thus, even if a U.S citizen may not actually be eligible for a PA
identification card, the mere fact of Arab, Middle Eastern, or Muslim
heritage may trigger disparate treatment.
Even Senator Barbara Boxer, who introduced the United States-Israel
Strategic Partnership Act in the Senate, acknowledges Israeli discrimination
against Arab Americans’ visa and admission determinations.98 She has
defended the bill on the basis of its requirement that Israel exercise a
“reasonable effort” to prevent discrimination against all American
citizens.99 Indeed, she argues that including Israel in the Visa Waiver
Program would provide the United States leverage to end such
discriminatory treatment. However, as the bill specifically qualifies the
requirement of a “reasonable effort” with the phrase “without jeopardizing
the security of the State of Israel,”100 Israel may be able to justify and
continue its current policies under those conditions.
Citizenship determination has long been understood as the sole
prerogative of the sovereign.101 In this instance, Israel’s ascription of
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. “PA ID holders, as well as persons believed to have claim to a PA ID by virtue of
ancestry, will be treated for immigration purposes as residents of the West Bank and Gaza,
regardless of whether they also hold U.S. citizenship.” Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See SISKIN, supra note 67, at 15.
99. Id. The bill states, in full, that the Secretary of State must certify that Israel “has
made every reasonable effort, without jeopardizing the security of the State of Israel, to
ensure that reciprocal travel privileges are extended to all United States citizens.” S. 462,
113th Cong. § 9(2) (2013).
100. S. 462 § 9(2).
101. Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 694
(2011) (“As a matter of traditional doctrine, international law has had little to say about the
citizenship practices of states and the terms on which states determine the boundaries of their
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Palestinian identity, combined with its policy of selective recognition of
dual nationality, implies an Israeli claim of sovereignty over the Palestinian
territories, which, while offensive to the aspirations of Palestinian
nationhood, is not inconsistent with the contemporary political reality.
Notably, it is Palestinian identity, as evidenced by eligibility (real or
assumed) for a Palestinian Authority identification card, and not Palestinian
nationality, that Israel ascribes.102 While the existence of the PA
identification card may be in anticipation of Palestinian nationhood—the
cards are issued pursuant to the self-governance provisions of the Oslo
Accords103—the fact of Palestinian non-nationhood, and Israel’s effective
exercise of sovereignty over the Palestinian territories, is reinscribed by its
ascription of Palestinian identity. The Palestinian Authority might
ultimately issue the identification cards, but it does so subject to Israeli
control.
Echoing the duality of India’s visa and citizenship policy, Israel’s
constriction of the citizenship of Americans of Palestinian, Arab, and
Muslim origin coexists with the liberal extension of citizenship to Jews
under Israel’s Law of Return.104 A foundational instrument of the Israeli
national project, the Law of Return reflects an ethnic model of citizenship
that dates back nearly to the creation of the state; it has served as a principal
vehicle for fulfilling the state’s ambition to be a Jewish homeland.105 As
Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled argue, ethno-nationalism has been one of
three predominant strands in Israeli citizenship practice and theory,
counterbalanced by democratic commitments and mediated by
republicanism.106 Whereas republicanism defines that nation—and thus the
citizen—on the basis of territory, ethno-nationalism defines the nation on
ethnic grounds. In the subcontinent, the cleaving of colonial India into two
bordering nations has led to ethnic differentiation on both sides of the
border. Likewise, the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish

memberships.”); see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 124 (1995)
(discussing minority rights claims in a contexts where sovereign states have unlimited power
to determine citizenship).
102. See Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, supra note 91.
103. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.P.L.O., Sep. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) (Oslo I Accord); Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.O., Sep. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551
(1997) (Oslo II Accord).
104. Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.). Originally enacted by the
Knesset in 1950 and amended in 1954 and 1970, the Law of Return provides, “Every Jew
has the right to come to this country as an oleh.” Id. § 1.
105. Since 1948, over 3.1 million people have immigrated to Israel. Andrew Esensten,
Rate of Jewish Immigration to Israel Leveling Off, HA’ARETZ (Mar. 10, 2013, 6:15 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/rate-of-jewish-immigration-toisrael-leveling-off.premium-1.508321.
106. GERSON SHAFIR & YOAV PELED, BEING ISRAELI: THE DYNAMICS OF MULTIPLE
CITIZENSHIP 33 (2002) (“[T]he inclusionary principle of democracy and the exclusionary
principle of Jewish nationalism could coexist only because, and only insofar as, they were
mediated by republicanism as part of the colonial project of building the nation-state and
attaining national citizenship.”).
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homeland demanded differentiation from bordering Palestinian and Arab
territories, and therefore peoples.
It is a verity that the Jewish identity of Israel is a central—if contested—
conceit of the nation. (In this regard, Israel’s ethno-nationalism bears a
stronger similarity to that of Pakistan, itself conceived of as a homeland for
a religious minority, than to that of India.) As in the case of India, then,
Israel’s normative conception of citizenship is inextricable from the selfconception of the nation and the nation-building project. By this account,
citizenship is culturally specific.
II. VISA POLICY AS SITE OF CONTEST: A CLASH OF CITIZENSHIPS
Visa programs—the regulated interchange of citizens by states—
represent a point of contact, and therefore potential conflict, between
competing understandings of citizenship.
Whereas citizenship is,
fundamentally, a national status, visa programs subject citizens of one
country to the values, including the citizenship values, of another. The
ethno-nationalist dimensions of India’s visa policy toward Americans of
Pakistani descent and Israel’s treatment of Americans of Palestinian, Arab,
and Muslim descent pose a fundamental challenge to American conceptions
of equal citizenship. Indeed, the seemingly mundane, bureaucratic
determination of permission to visit made by one state may devalue the
privileges of citizenship of another. In the cases of India and Israel with
respect to U.S. citizens, the liberal conception of citizenship as unalloyed
and indivisible is tested and even nullified. U.S. policy in response is
therefore not merely a matter of protecting the interests of individual
American citizens—a core obligation of a state to its citizens—but of
protecting an American conception of citizenship itself.
While the history of American citizenship practices is rife with
exclusionary practices—one need only recall Dred Scott v. Sandford,107 the
exclusion of women from basic citizenship rights,108 and the period of
Asian exclusion, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924,109 which
barred admission of Asian immigrants because they were racially
“ineligible to citizenship”110—ethnic assimilation predominates in
107. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
108. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 68 (1961) (holding that restricting mandatory
jury service to men was constitutional), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 162 (1875) (holding that restricting the
suffrage to males did not infringe on women’s rights as citizens), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
109. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153. According to the Office
of the Historian in the U.S. State Department, “the most basic purpose of the 1924
Immigration Act was to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity.” The Immigration Act
of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S. DEPARTMENT ST., OFF. HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
110. As a result of the Naturalization Acts of 1790 and 1870, Asians were racially
ineligible for naturalization, and by operation of the “ineligible to citizenship” language of
the 1924 Immigration Act, were barred from admission. For a discussion of the period of
Asian exclusion, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
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contemporary state discourse and practice. The Fourteenth Amendment’s
liberal granting of jus soli citizenship is itself an assimilationist instrument,
promising that nationality-based distinctions will last no more than a
generation, and committing the nation to territoriality as a predominant,
though not exclusive, basis for citizenship.111 As Peter Spiro has argued,
territorial presence has long served not only to define the political
community, but to constitute national identity.112 National origin and
ancestry discrimination are explicitly prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of
1964,113 the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,114 and U.S.
Supreme Court case law on equal protection115 and interpreting Section
1981.116 Of course, national origin and ancestry-based discrimination
persists, notwithstanding these formal legal protections, and concerns have
been especially acute in the antiterrorism and national security contexts,
particularly in the years following the September 11 attacks.117 But the
assimilationist ideology is today foundational to the self-conception of the
country as a “nation of immigrants.”118 That ideology, in turn, drives a
normative vision of citizenship that is significantly more civic and
classically liberal than the ethno-nationalist strands visible in contemporary
Indian and Israeli citizenship practices.
In the contemporary moment, then, the United States occupies a different
normative space regarding citizenship than India and Israel. The difference
is profound, not only in its practical effects—that is, the differential
treatment of U.S. citizens—but conceptually. In the liberal conception, the
citizen is an abstract, universal figure who obtains equality by virtue of the
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12–15 (1998). For a
broader history of exclusion in American citizenship practice, see ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC
IDEALS (1997).
111. See generally PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER
GLOBALIZATION (2008). Jus soli citizenship is granted to anyone born on the country in
question’s soil. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision for jus soli citizenship,
a statute provides for jus sanguinis citizenship, or citizenship by descent. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2012).
112. SPIRO, supra note 111.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006). Although the Act uses only the term “national origin”
and not “ancestry,” earlier versions of the statute used both terms—in a review of the
legislative history of Title VII of the Act, the Supreme Court concluded that the deletion of
“ancestry” was not intended to effect a material change, as the two terms were considered
synonymous. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973); see also Juan F.
Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 574 n.14 (1995).
114. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
115. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (stating national origin to be a
suspect classification for equal protection purposes).
116. See St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that
Congress, with § 1981, “intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics”).
117. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002).
118. See generally SUSAN F. MARTIN, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (2010) (tracking the
history of the United States’ self-conception of openness to immigration and immigrants).
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state’s neutrality as to all citizens; the status as citizen is dispositive, and
trumps all other affiliations, whether claimed or ascribed.119 Such an
understanding renders the notion of “equal citizenship” redundant, for
citizenship is, by definition, a condition of equality. T.H. Marshall’s notion
of the image of an ideal citizenship goes further and posits citizenship as a
developing institution,120 or as John Hoffman terms it, a “momentum
concept” that evolves over time and provides a metric of societal
For Marshall, citizenship is a dynamic heuristic for
progress.121
egalitarianism. But whether static or dynamic, citizenship is, in the liberal
understanding, an unimpeachable claim of equal membership, treatment,
and right. To peer beyond the mantle of citizenship, and to value kinship,
race, gender, ancestry, or other affiliations, is anathema.
Whereas the liberal model of citizenship demands a radical agnosticism
of states as to its citizens’ differing conceptions of the good, ethnonationalist models conceive of the citizen as an embodiment of the state.
Cultural homogeneity binds citizens to one another and to the state; the
identity of the citizen and the state converge. As Shafir and Peled write:
In the ethno-nationalist, or völkish, approach, citizenship is not an
expression of individual rights or of contribution to the common good, but
of membership in a homogenous descent group . . . . The community, in
this view, is not conceived of as existing outside the state, or over against
it in some way, but rather as expressed in and embodied by the state.
Thus, the tension between the individual and the state, or between the
community and the state, that characterizes liberal and republican
thinking, respectively, is absent from the ethno-nationalist discourse.
Instead, this discourse integrates non-political, cultural elements into the
concept of citizenship. It portrays nations as radically different from one
another because their members possess distinct cultural markers, such as
language, religion, and history. Since nations are thus inscribed into the
identity of their members, ethnic nationalism denies the possibility of
cultural assimilation . . . .122

A citizenship based upon the inscription of the nation in the identity of the
ethno-citizen enables deterritorialization. The fact of shared descent is
durable, if not permanent, across time and geography. The third generation
person of Indian descent is claimed by the state as an Indian, and the Jew is
presumptively Israeli. In both cases, actual citizenship requires a volitional
act on the part of the individual, but that state has already consented. In
contrast, the liberal model abhors kinship- or descent-based particularity

119. See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 106, at 4 (“Since the liberal state is supposed to be
neutral with respect to its citizens’ conceptions of the good, and treat all of them as equal,
regardless of their ascriptive and other affiliations, liberal theory must constitute the citizen
as an abstract, universal subject stripped of all particularity.”).
120. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in INEQUALITY AND SOCIETY 148, 149
(Jeff Manza & Michael Sauder eds., 2009).
121. JOHN HOFFMAN, CITIZENSHIP BEYOND THE STATE 138 (2004).
122. SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 106, at 6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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and conceives of citizenship as a universalizing move, a state technology
that obliterates such status.123
This is not to suggest that either the United States on the one hand, or
India and Israel on the other, represent pure forms of any one citizenship
model. Rather, each reflects a significant degree of hybridity. This is
reflected by the fact that the United States provides both jus soli and jus
sanguinis citizenship. As Christian Joppke has argued, “All states are
‘ethnic’ in the sense that birth is the usual way of becoming a member of a
state: ‘states are primarily communities of descent.’”124 Thus, although the
principle of jus soli, entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment, enables
cultural assimilation, it does not ensure it. Rather, the assimilationist
capacity of jus soli depends upon immigration policy, patterns, and
histories. In the period of Asian exclusion, then, when Asian immigration
came to a standstill, and in the era of national origin quotas,125 jus soli
consolidated an ethnic notion of citizenship rather than undoing it.126 And
while immigration patterns have shifted dramatically since 1965, existing
demographics, combined with jus soli and jus sanguinis practices,
perpetuate dominant ethnic characteristics. Likewise, India and Israel’s
citizenship practices are not purely ethno-nationalist, but instead interweave
ethnic, civic, and republican attributes. As Joppke notes, “Tied to a
territory and based on a personal substratum that reproduces itself
intergenerationally, the modern state is a fundamentally dualistic institution,
being territorial and ethnic at the same time.”127
This commonality notwithstanding, the ideological centrality of ethnic
assimilation to the American national project stands in sharp contrast to the
foundational and contemporary significance of ethno-nationalism in India’s
123. As Anupama Roy notes, the universalizing move of liberal citizenship often fails to
fulfill its promise of equality by virtue of its uneven incorporation of differently situated
individuals. “The universalist framework of citizenship . . . effaces the manner in which
citizenship is differentially experienced along axes of class, caste, gender, language, etc.”
ROY, supra note 2, at 17. I have written previously about the differential incorporation of
citizenship in practice, with respect to Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks. See Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the
Day After September 11, 72 SOC. TEXT 101, 106 (2002) (discussing a “citizenship exchange
market in which the relative belonging of any one racial or ethnic community fluctuates in
accordance with prevailing social and political pressures”).
124. Christian Joppke, Citizenship Between De- and Re-ethnicization 12 (Russell Sage
Found., Working Paper No. 204, 2003) (quoting THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF &
DOUGLAS B. KLUSMEYER, CITIZENSHIP POLICIES FOR AN AGE OF MIGRATION 14 (2002)).
125. Beginning in 1921, and continuing in modified form until 1965, the United States
used a quota system for immigrant admissions based upon previously existing proportions of
the foreign-born population. The formula thus privileged immigration from European
countries because of their previously unrestricted immigration, and as a result contributed to
the relative homogeneity of immigrants and their U.S. citizen children for a period of four
decades. For a history of national origins quotas and the production of the racialized
immigrant other, see generally MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2003).
126. This is true despite the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898), holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extended to U.S.-born
children of Chinese descent notwithstanding the Asian Exclusion Acts.
127. Joppke, supra note 124, at 18.
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and Israel’s respective national self-conceptions. The modern overlay of
national security considerations, and the concern for a kind of citizenship
perfidy, may provide a new rationale for differentiation as among the
citizenship of others, but as Part I demonstrates, the imperative to
differentiation in India and Israel is longstanding.
This is not to downplay the salience of the current national security
moment for contemporary citizenship practices.
Rather, the post–
September 11 incarnation of national security concern has placed
significant pressure on liberal notions of citizenship, testing their limits and
creating opportunities for either the reassertion of liberal principles or,
alternatively, their mutation. The United States has hardly been immune
from such pressure. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the
government targeted not only Arab, Muslim, and South Asian foreign
nationals for a range of surveillance and enforcement practices, but U.S.
citizens of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian descent as well.128 In 2011, the
Associated Press and other media discovered a New York Police
Department surveillance program, operating since 2001, which “has
mapped, monitored, and analyzed American Muslim daily life throughout
New York City, and even its surrounding states.”129
Moreover, it appears that the United States at one point proposed the
same kind of intra-citizenship differentiation on the basis of national
security concerns—in the context of the Visa Waiver Program, no less—
that India and Israel practice today. In 2007, the New York Times reported
that then Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff was negotiating
with the British government “on how to curb the access of British citizens
of Pakistani origin to the United States.”130 Although the article is vague
about the “visa loophole” that the United States sought to close,131 it can
only refer to the Visa Waiver Program, of which the United Kingdom is a
member.132 According to the New York Times, one option under
consideration was “to single out Britons of Pakistani origin, requiring them
to make visa applications for the United States.”133 Thus, if the report is
accurate, the United States sought, in the name of national security, to peel
back the citizenship of certain Britons, based solely upon their national
origin. Such efforts, if in fact made, did not succeed, but the story suggests
anew the precariousness of equal citizenship, the seductiveness of ethnonationalist policies in the current national security moment, and the need for
128. See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Hate
Violence As Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2004); Akram & Johnson, supra
note 117; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).
129. THE CREATING LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY & RESPONSIBILITY (CLEAR)
PROJECT ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS
4 (2013).
130. Jane Perlez, U.S. Seeks Closing of Visa Loophole: Britons of Pakistani Origin Gain
Scrutiny on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at A1.
131. Id.
132. See Anil Kalhan, The Visa “Loophole” and the Pakistani Penalty, DORF ON L. (May
3, 2007, 3:31 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2007/05/visa-loophole-and-pakistanipenalty.html.
133. Perlez, supra note 130.
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state vigilance in international visa policy and practice to protect not only
the state’s citizens, but the nation’s conception of citizenship.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the controversies around India’s and Israel’s visa policies
with respect to U.S. citizens, this is not a story of clean hands on the part of
one state and unclean on the part of another. Rather, citizenship practices,
like citizenship theories, are multiple, dynamic, overlapping, and often
internally contradictory.134 And yet, some theories have greater hold on a
nation than others, owing to each nation’s unique history, geography, and
ideological practices and commitments. As Roy argues, “Citizenship is . . .
inextricably tied with the processes of state formation.”135 Visa policies
such as those discussed here bring these differences into relief and pit
national citizenship ideologies in contest with one another.
Visa policy is bureaucratic, high volume, and oftentimes tedious. But
understanding the controversies surrounding the Indian and Israeli policies
as implicating not merely the travel interests of individual citizens and the
security interests of the state, but the normative visions of citizenship itself,
opens opportunities for more meaningful development of citizenship
practices. Recognizing the cultural specificities of citizenship theory and
practice may, in turn, enable the development of shared understandings. It
is from a place of ethical particularity, then, that the universality promised
by equal citizenship may be best achieved.

134. See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 106, at 6 (“In most societies two or more discourses
of citizenship, superimposed on one another, vie for dominance. As Judith Shklar and
Rogers Smith have shown, even in the United States, where the Lockean liberal tradition has
long been held to dominate political life, its sway fluctuated throughout history and was
continuously contested in theory.”).
135. ROY, supra note 2, at 11.

